With the intent of efficient occupying under-utilized spectrum, radio environment map (REM) based cognitive radio (CR) 
A potential solution to this problem is to employ the concept of Radio Environment Map (REM) [5] . REM is envisioned as an integrated database consisting of multi-domain information, which supports global cross-layer optimization by enabling CU to operate through various layers. In detail, REM can provide various environment information, i. e. Geographical features, available services, relevant policies, and experiences [6] . These, REM information needs to be updated according to the observations from distributed CUs and then disseminated throughout the whole network [7, 8] . Several specific models and schemes have been proposed for CR networks in recent literature. For example, a generic top-down approach is leveraged to obtain the situation information from REM database [5, 6] .
However, to the best of the authors' knowledge, very little literature exists which addresses the security and reliability of transmitting of the REM information for REM database or CUs. Our recent research shows that a reliable information authentication scheme is more important than the effectiveness of REM information. That is because the false spectrum sensing or forged data from malicious CUs will lead to a wrong spectrum sensing decision. Then PUs will be interfered and even more serious the whole network will be in trouble. However, how to perform reliable authentication under dynamic radio scenarios is an open research issue.
Motivated by this issue, this paper explores the potential authentication of REM information for CR networks. The final target for authenticating is to determine if the REM information is sent or received by those credible CUs and to make different responses to changing environment with those different attacking behaviors. In this paper, we propose a general authentication architecture which is called HeteHier (Heterogeneous Hierarchy). HeteHier flexibly utilizes reconfiguration mechanism and can adaptively embrace various network topologies. This flexibility also enables HeteHier to conveniently gather and distribute reliable REM information. As the special channel encoding can enhance the anti-interference and the tolerance to a certain BER (bit error rate), the authentication information can be embedded into any normal data stream under the threshold of BER. In one hand, the error of normal data can still be removed using decoding technology. On the other hand, the embedded information can be retrieved and can authenticate its source and integrity. This paper has three main contributions. Firstly, we propose a general authentication architecture for CUs to deploy the specific authentication protocol or strategies in REM-enabled CR networks. Secondly, we propose a novel information hiding strategy for the proposed HeteHier architecture. Additionally, an efficient authentication protocol by exploiting the channel encoding and decoding is given out. Thirdly, by conducting the security analysis, we prove that the effectiveness and adaptiveness of the proposed authentication protocol.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we describe the infrastructures and security threats for REM based CR networks in detail. Section 3 presents the high level structure of general authentication architecture HereHire. As a major component of HereHire, a robust information hiding strategy is detailed and its basic properties are discussed in section 4.1. Meanwhile, another important component of HereHire is an adaptive authentication protocol (AAP), which is given out in 4.2. Security analysis is shown in section 5. In section 6, we review the related works about this topic. We conclude the paper and briefly discuss the future works in Section 7.
Security threats in REM-enabled CR networks

chaotic sequence
The Chaos phenomenon, which is based on the definite equation, can be replayed if the initial state and the parameters are determined. The dynamic system relating with the equation is called a chaotic system. Chaotic sequence generally is generated by chaotic system with several potential characteristics, for example, the sensitivity to initial conditions, the random distribution (is true random sequence and like white noise), the strong autocorrelation but poor cross-correlation. Meanwhile, it is impossible to predict the long-term behavior of chaotic sequence due to its non-convergence and randomness.
Given a chaotic sequence {y j } detemined by an iterative equation, y j identifies the states of a dynamic system and y 0 denotes the initial state. This paper adopts the Logistic map which is the most known and widely used chaotic system and is defined as: Reliable Information Transmission: A Chaotic Sequence-Based Authentication Scheme for Radio Environment Maps Enabled Cognitive Radio Networks Li Zhang, Guoxin Zheng 50 ) 1 (
And the former peer research shows that the system locates in the chaotic state when μ is bigger than 3.5699456 and less than or equal to 4.
Overview of REM
The term of REM for CR networks was first coined by Y. Zhao et al. [6] . They envision the REM (as is shown in Fig. 1 ) as an integrated database that consists of comprehensive multi-domain information of the radio environment, for example, geographical features, available services, spectral regulations, locations and activities of PUs, policies, and past statistics. Usually, the performance of a CR network highly depends upon how much information about spectrum environment is available for each CU. Therefore, the rationale to disseminate REM information among CUs is to cater for the requirements of CUs by sharing global REM or distributed local REM. CU can know better about its radio environment with the help of REM information. By employing the disseminated REM information, CUs can derive the required information to coexist with PUs and others CUs, to migrate to the hidden node problem, and to improve the spectrum utilization and even the overall network performance. The REM-enabled CR network can alleviate the burden on individual CU by employing the REM information in a cooperative method. On the other hand, CUs not only receive REM information from REM database but also submit local information to REM database. Obviously, the security and the reliability of REM information are the key point of REM-enabled CR network. However, this topic has garnered little attention from the research community. The security aspects of REM must be addressed before the benefits of REM can be full reaped. 
Overview of security threats
The security threats of REM mainly include illegal REM information injection and forged REM information transmission. As the REM collects various characteristic data from widespread spectrum sensing CUs, an attacker can transmit false local spectrum sensing data maliciously to a data collector, causing the data collector to make a wrong spectrum accessing decision. Furthermore, other CUs will also access the channel and PUs will be interfered if CUs get the wrong REM information from data collector. On the other hand, CUs can not transmit any data if the attacker always releases that some channel is busy so that CUs suffer from the Denial of Service (DoS) attack.
Secondly, an attacker can also transmit forged REM information by emulating the data collector or REM decision centre. Once those CUs receive the REM information, they will trust that and make decision following the information. As a result, CUs are controlled by the attacker.
To counter these two threats, the most efficient method is user authenticating which is an important security mechanism for recognizing the legal users. In the following two sections, we will dwell on how to perform the user authentication.
General authentication architecture: HereHier
The proposed HereHier architecture is illustrated in Fig. 2 . These CUs (cu 1 , cu 2 … cu m , m is a positive integer) report the various sensing results (R 1 , R 2 , …, R m ) periodically to REM. To maintain an adequate level of accuracy in the heterogeneous networks, the data must be authenticated (by A 1 … A n , and a 3 , they are all the authentication executors) before is sent to the fusion center. The data also need to be aggregated (by fusion center C 1 … C n , they are all the data aggregation executors) when they are identified from the legal CU. As to the data fusion techniques are out of the scope of this research, they are reviewed in [4] . The final results derived from fusion center can be put into REM. The sensing data may experience multi-levels authentications and fusions from CU to REM though Fig. 2 only depicts two levels.
Figure 2. The proposed authentication hierarchy: AuthHier
Information gathering: REM collector authentication is successful if the sensing reports are transmitted by a legal CU and is failed if the reports are forged by an attacker. Once the REM collector finds a sensing report is from an attacker, this report or result will be thrown and REM collector will ignore all the data from this attacker. Additionally, data fusion techniques also can remove those false sensing results from malfunctioned CU. With the assistance of these two aspects, the reliability of REM information can be improved and enhanced significantly. On the other hand, if any CU wants to gain the local REM information from REM, REM and CU all need to authenticate each other. That is to say that REM should identify the requester is a legal CU. And CU also needs to identify that the REM information is sent from a legal REM and not from a spoofing attacker.
Information distributing: REM information can be disseminated to CUs (the CU 1 , CU 2 , CU 3 , CU 4 , and CU 5 in Fig. 2 ) via various methods. For centralized CR networks, REM information is shared and exchanged between central node and lots of CUs. Hence, the broadcasting based distribution of REM information is efficient [6] . The CU 1 and CU 5 in Fig. 2 can get the spectrum decision directly from REM. Thus, REM broadcasts the radio information periodically and CU 1 , CU 5 can get the information needed. On the contrary, for the distributed networks, such as ad hoc CR networks, clustering based dissemination of REM information will be more efficient. In Fig. 2 , CU 1 , CU 2 , CU 3 , and CU 4 compose a cluster and CU 1 is cluster head. So CU 1 has to relay all the spectrum decisions required by CU 2 , CU 3 , and CU 4 .
The deployment of security strategy: Obviously, the hierarchy described in Fig. 2 is a general authentication architecture which can embrace various authentication mechanisms and security strategies. It can absorb the mechanisms of information encryption, identification, access control in different levels of the network protocol stacks in one hand. On the other hand, different security policies or protocols can also be deployed in heterogeneous topology situations. Furthermore, these measures can be adopted in a local position or in the overall network by means of ad hoc-based or centered management.
Dynamic reconfiguration: The meaning of dynamic reconfiguration is two fold. Heterogeneous security protocols need to update the related parameters used in the real practice and the network membership belonging to a specific application. Additionally, the authentication mechanism usually needs to be dynamic adjusted with the changing of network topologies and the performance feedback, such as the more rigorous authentication metrics should be taken into effect if the forged REM message received gets too much. 
Authentication information hiding scheme
The techniques of information hiding have been proposed to solve the problems of illicit interception and unauthorized multimedia data. The main operation of information hiding is to embed secret data into a host medium so that the hidden data can not be extracted except the intended recipient [9] . Channel information hiding is a communication process utilizing the error tolerance and redundancy of channel encoding to embed secret information into host data. Obviously, it will lead to a certain BER for the host data. However, those error bits can be corrected and restored if the information hidden in the host data less than the acceptable detection BER. In this condition, the secret information is considered as noise can be removed without interference to the host data. The hidden information can also be derived by the intended receiver using the specific extracting algorithm through error correcting coding.
Inspired by this, we can apply the channel information hiding techniques to transmitting authentication information. An authentication information hiding scheme is proposed as depicted in Fig.  3 . This scheme is comprised of two components which are the embedding and the extracting of authentication information, respectively. The embedding process is described as follows:
(1) Authentication information A experiences the channel encoding and is called authentication code '
A .
(2) A chaotic sequence CS1 is derived utilizing a key K 1 . Employing equation (1) A , then ' A will be disturbed using chaos sequence CS1 and we can get a disorder sequence I , which has the same statistical characteristic with random sequence. That is 1 ' CS A I   . An illustration of the authentication information hiding process is shown in the upper half of Fig. 3 . In this scheme, all the host data h is encoded by employing the convolutional coding, which can detect and correct the errors caused by channel noise and other random errors. After the channel coding, we call them host code H, ) ,..., , ( When the target user receives the data through public communication channel, the data is ' HI because HI is distorted by the unreliable wireless channel. Nevertheless, the distortion can be removed by channel decoding. So the receiver can get the host data h. Obviously, target user can also derive the secret information which is hidden and transmitted in host data by performing the reversed operations executed by transmitter in the left of Fig. 3 and utilizing the K 1 and K 2 . In specific, receiver first will extract the hidden data ' I with extracting algorithm and host data h. The authentication code A  with a certain error will be descrambled after the XOR operation with CS1. And the authentication data Ã can be obtained through channel decoding. 
AAP: Adaptive authentication protocol
The adaptive authentication protocol (AAP) is shown in the lower half of Fig. 3 . On the left is the process to embed authentication information while the right is to extract authentication information. In our AAP scheme, it is assumed that each two user own two secret keys K 1 and K 2 . Hence, our AAP consists of four phases and is described as follows (in Fig. 4 ).
Transmitter
U1
Receiver U2
Registration phase:
Embedding phase:
Figure 4. Proposed authentication scheme
Registration phase. In this phase, any two users who want to communicate with another exchange their authentication key K 1 
Security discussions
Key distribution
In this subsection, we mainly discuss the scalability and adaptivity of the proposed authentication scheme in terms of the distribution of the keys and how to deal with the different dynamically feedbacks, respectively.
Scalability of the distribution of keys.
In the extreme condition, K 1 and K 2 are all different for every two users. Actually, for the sake of simplicity, the users in a same group or cluster can use the common
However, the distribution can be implemented with the helping of PKI. The scale of a group can be determined upon the different network density and security requirements. As inappropriate grouping will undermine the effectiveness of authentication, it is optional and should be performed cautiously.
Adaptivity of the APP. According to the coding theorem, the redundancy of channel coding is limited [9] . In addition, the capacity of channel is time-varied usually. So the secret information embedded should be adaptively determined depending upon the different channel conditions. That is to say that AAP have to change authentication information transfer rate according to the BER of channel decoding. On the other hand, C 2 is independent of K 1 and K 2 . Hence, K 1 and K 2 implement the secret communication while C 2 executes the security authentication. And C 2 can be updated flexibly. Low complexity. The process of authentication data is embedded and extracted almost has no extra overhand and can be finished with normal channel encoding and decoding. So the extra operation is to disturb and descramble the authentication data. Nevertheless, both of them spend very little time (the time to generate a chaotic sequence and to perform a XOR operation). This can guarantee that the delay to transfer the authentication data is minimized. Hence, AAP can authenticate application data in real time without the time spent in [10] .
Security analysis
In this subsection, we give an in-depth analysis of the proposed scheme in terms of security properties.
Brute-force attacks. In APP, authentication information is embedded into channel data and the whole process is hidden. As there are noise and random errors in the wireless channel, it is very difficult to find where the secret information is located. Furthermore, the secret data has the same statistical characteristic with random sequence after the disturbing operation using a chaotic sequence. Even the attackers can find that, it is impossible to figure out the meaning of C 2 which is mapped from a hash function. It is computationally infeasible to invert the one-way hash function ) ( h .
Replay attacks. An attacker F can collect the data packets of HI which are sent from U 1 to U 2 . After a while, F will transmit these data packets to U 2 , periodically. However, U 2 can verify the freshness of the timestamp T 1 . If the T 1 is too old or U 2 find any paradox with the data from F, as a result, U 2 can get a warning message and terminate any connection with F. Thus, our scheme can resist replay attacks using timestamp T 1 . Additionally, T 1 can be alternated with different freshness requirements. Forgery attacks. An attacker F wants to be a legal user by joining a session with other legal users.
Once F gets the chance to report any spectrum sensing results, F will spoof REM or fusion center node N. Nevertheless, N can filter the false information by data fusion. N also can decrease the length of ∆t until N ignores all the data packets from F.
Secret key forward secrecy. In our scheme, even if the K 1 and K 2 happen to be revealed, the attacker F can not impersonate other users by using the revealed K 1 and K 2 , because every two users have different K 1 and K 2 or different authentication information.
Leak of key. In our AAP, although F can steal U 1 's K pr , K 1 ,and K 2 , F still can not spoof U 2 without the knowledge of U 2 's private key K pr . Meanwhile, once U 2 found that the information received from U 1 are false, it will ignore the application data from U 1 and inform U 1 to change its key.
Secure key change. As the keys are exchanged through secure communication channel, they are safe at this stage. Specifically, K 1 and K 2 are negotiated by two users while the public key K pu and private key K pr should be distributed based on PKI. Obviously, the security of local K 1 and K 2 is independent of the security of K pr and K pu . So the security of this scheme is enhanced significantly.
Vulnerability and drawbacks. Actually, the best authentication scheme should not rely on secure key exchange but resist all kinds of attacks, which happen during the key changing [10, 11, 12] .
Related works
Researching for cognitive radio networks are full of challenges for both wireless and network communications society. While the development of cognitive radio spectrum sensing [13] and MAC protocol [14] , especially white space detection, has received considerable attention, the topic of how to provide CR users and applications with wireless security in CR networks was discussed very little [15] . Ruiliang Chen et al. firstly proposed the issue of security in cognitive networks [16] . They call the attack and security threat is primary user emulation (PUE) attack which is launched by the adversary's transmitter. To counter this treat, a location verification scheme is integrated into the spectrum sensing mechanism to distinguish the incumbent signals from unlicensed signals. Obviously, the development of spectrum sensing techniques capable of accurately detecting the existence of primary user or spectrum opportunities can alleviate this type of attack. Additionally, in [4] , two security issues posing serious threat to spectrum sensing is discussed. They are incumbent emulation and spectrum sensing data falsification, respectively. And they may be weak havoc in falsification distributed spectrum sensing. Meanwhile, some countermeasures to these threats are also indicated. However, there is no practical security to provide authentication and encryption.
Recently, the authors of Reference [17] systematically analyze and delineate the key challenges in providing security in cognitive networks. They also point out that the current security posture of the emerging IEEE 802.22 standard and identify the potential vulnerabilities along with potential mitigation approaches. In specific, a review of various jammer threats on CR network design is given out in [2] . This comes with a basic lexicon provided to discuss the related issues. A further contribution to the field of CR security is in [18] , the two types of attacks against CR network MAC protocols are analyzed. And other security threats in CR network are also revealed in [19] . Paul et al. [20] give out a detail cyclostationary Signatures applied in the cognitive radio for the practical application. Amita and Timothy [21] also proposed a Hammer model to access the potential CR physical layer attacks.
The concept of REM is an extension of the available resource map (ARM), which has been used as a real-time map of all radio activities for CR network applications in unlicensed wide area networks (UWANS) [22, 23] . The performance of REM-enabled CR network was evaluated with imperfect REM information in [24, 25] . The cost efficient approach is used to improve spectrum utilization by using the REM-enabled CRs as cognitive users. The performance of REM-enabled CR network is highly depends upon how exact of the channel state information derived from REM. Therefore, REM-enabled CR can efficient and reliable utilize spectrum in both space and time domains. Subsequently, Y. Zhao et al. consider how to establish REM service for cognitive wireless regional area networks (WRAN) and illustrated how to apply the REM to a variety of applications in WRAN systems [26] . They also designed the related learning algorithm for WRAN cognitive engine leveraging the REM information [27] . Nevertheless, these researchs work fail to offer security guarantee for CU.
Differently with aforementioned methods, there are several other contributions using the supports of physical layer to extend the concept of security. K. Kim et al. applied the specific emitter identification concept to identify the different CR devices by exploiting the second-order cyclic features of OFDM Reliable Information Transmission: A Chaotic Sequence-Based Authentication Scheme for Radio Environment Maps Enabled Cognitive Radio Networks Li Zhang, Guoxin Zheng signals [28] . Additionally, X. Li et al. proposed a method to control CU transmission power purely from their physical-layer received signals for CR networks [29] . Their method utilized that the transceiver hardware can immune the software attacks. Indeed, these two promising ideas worth being further studied.
Conclusions
In this paper, firstly general REM-based authentication architecture HereHier is proposed to facilitate the deployment of CR networks. This architecture can integrate any authentication scheme with CR applications flexibly. Based on HereHier, a novel authentication scheme AAP using chaos sequence and channel encoding is given out. In this scheme, the authentication information is embedded into channel data and is transmitted as hidden information. Then error bits of host data can be corrected through channel decoding techniques. Furthermore, we indicate the scalability and adaptiveness of the proposed scheme. Moreover, we analyze the security of our AAP in detail. It is shown that AAP can prevent brute-force attack, replay attack, and forgery attack. Additionally, it can provide some useful features, e. g., low computation complexity, secret key forwarding, and prevention of leak of key. It is also noted that our authentication protocol can also be used in other network sceneries after a little modification. However, we still need to strengthen the key management and efficiency of authentication in the future. And how to provide more reliable authenticating utilizing the hardware support is another direction worth to further study.
